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Abstract 
 
The following article offers a brief overview of current nanotechnology policy, regulation and 
ethics in Europe and The People’s Republic of China  with the intent of noting (dis)similarities in 
approach, before focusing on the involvement of the public in science and technology policy (i.e. 
participatory Technology Assessment).  
 
The conclusions of this article are, that (a) in terms of nanosafety as expressed through policy 
and regulation, China PR and the EU have similar approaches towards, and concerns about, 
nanotoxicity – the official debate on benefits and risks is not markedly different in the two 
regions; (b) that there is a similar economic drive behind both regions’ approach to 
nanodevelopment, the difference being the degree of public concern admitted; and (c) 
participation in decision-making is fundamentally different in the two regions. Thus in China PR, 
the focus is on the responsibility of the scientist; in the EU, it is about government accountability 
to the public.  The formulation of a Code of Conduct for scientists in both regions (China PR’s 
predicted for 2012) reveals both similarity and difference in approach to nanotechnology 
development. This may change, since individual responsibility alone cannot guide S&T 
development, and as public participation is increasingly seen globally as integral to 
governmental decision-making. 
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Ought bioethics in East Asia to use the same approaches (assumptions, principles, 
theories, styles, methods, concepts) as bioethics developed in the West, or ought it to 
reflect a specifically East Asian approach to the subject? (Fan,1997: 310) 
 
 
Ethics and socio-ethical analysis have increasingly become an integral part of the assessment 
of any new technology and its applications (Berne, 2004). Certain European countries have 
instigated national programs dedicated to ethics in science and technology (S&T) (e.g. The 
Netherlands) or have established institutes to conduct research into the ethical implications of 
new technologies (e.g. national genomics centres in the UK and The Netherlands). In China PR, 
ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) analysis is becoming a more prominent issue when 
evaluating new S&T developments., but is not yet as well established as in Europe. 
A growing trend since the 1980s in terms of S&T evaluation in the EU has been that of 
pTA, or participatory Technology Assessment, a drive towards incorporating social concerns 
into technology assessment through public dialogue. Such a trend has developed under 
pressure of increasing public scepticism about scientific research and development (Gaskell, et 
al. 2002: 386). The outcome of such scepticism has been a demand for more informed public 
debate, and greater public involvement both in how new technologies should be regulated and 
funded (Doubleday, 2007: 211), and how they should be applied to everyday life. Policymakers 
anxious not to repeat the mistakes associated with the introduction of biotechnology initiatives 
such as genetically modified (GM) foods, namely, that ‘legislation came too late and with too 
little public engagement and ethical reflection’, began to call for the inclusion of ethical and 
societal impacts of potentially transformative new technologies at an early stage in policymaking 
(Freidman, 1997; Janasoff, 2004).   
Public dissatisfaction in The People’s Republic of China (China PR) after various food 
safety scandals relating to milk and to gutter oil suggests scepticism about regulation is not only 
an EU issue.1 A China Daily 2010 survey concluded that more than 85 percent of respondents 
were worried about the potential health hazards of GM food.2  Hu & Chen’s earlier survey of 
                                                          
1 The 2008 scandal, when milk from the Sanlu corporation was found to be contaminated by 
melamine, was China’s second major baby-milk scandal. The death toll from the Sanlu 
contamination varies, according to whom one reads, from 3 to 11, but up to 300 000 children 
were allegedly reported as affected. The gutter oil scandal erupted in September 2011 after 
reports of companies recycling oil from drains behind restaurants. 
2 China Daily 3 April, 2010. Retrieved January 7, 2012, from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/04/content_9534076.htm 
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Beijing consumers found that consumers’ purchase intentions of GM vegetable oil were low, 
indicating a considerable skepticism toward GM products’ (Hu et al, 2004). After the granting of 
biosafety licenses to two rice strains, 120 Chinese academics signed a public petition in March 
2010 asking the Ministry of Agriculture to withdraw the certificates (Jia, 2010).  
China PR has an established survey process on S&T public perceptions, but such a 
process has tended to be quite general, with a lack of surveys on specific issues and more 
importantly, a dearth of implementation processes for using such surveys in policy debates.  
 Can China PR catch up to Europe in this area? Europe is increasingly co-operating and 
competing with both China and India, which are also keen to develop their S&T sectors. Such 
new interdependences between global actors require, arguably, new global approaches to S& T 
policy, or at least, recognition of differing local approaches to what is perhaps a global science, 
The complex question of whether there can ever be a global approach that does not run the risk 
of neo-colonialism (Widdows, 2007; Adorno, 2009), or an imposition of ‘colonial’ values on the 
East aside (Finkler, 2008), one can note general similarities in Eastern and Western approaches 
to the dangers of nanotechnology. The major differences are in the processes by which public 
concerns are mediated in Europe and China PR. 
  
 
 
China PR:  Nanohistory, nanoregulation, nanopolicy and nanoethics  
Of the Asian countries, Japan and China are leading the way in nanotechnology.  The national 
program in China PR dates from the establishment of the National Steering Committee for 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NSCNN) in 2000 to coordinate nationwide efforts on 
nanotechnology R&D. The committee is composed of 21 scientists from universities, institutes 
and industry and 7 administrators from government agencies. 
Research goes back 13 years before that, however, to the 1987 National High 
Technology Plan (or ‘863 Plan’), that supported ultrafine particles research. In 1990, the State 
Science and Technology Commission [the predecessor of the current Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST)] approved the ‘Climbing Up’ project, in which nanomaterials research was 
emphasized. In the early 1990s, several Chinese academic research organizations collaborated 
to accelerate research efforts in China on nanomaterials science, while MOST’s 973 Program 
(1999) was aimed at supporting basic research on nanostructures such as nanotubes. The 973 
Program’s significance lies in its emphasis on the standardization of procedures and 
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assessment and test protocols, which tend to form the basic framework structure for regulatory 
considerations of nanomaterials  (Jarvis et al, 2010).  
Since 2002, when the China PR National Science Foundation produced a 
nanotechnology plan, nanotechnology has been recognized as a high-priority area by the 
Chinese government (Lee, Zhao & Liang, 2011). In China PR’s National Medium- and Long-
term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020), nanotechnology is one of four 
large projects explicitly mentioned in the plan as a priority mission area, and as a key frontier 
technology, over the next 15 years (Suttmeier et al, 2006). The 2009 national research plan set 
aside 0.15 billion RMB (yuan) for nanotechnology; Appelbaum and Parker conclude that, with 
respect to nanotechnology, China is closing the gap that once existed between itself and the 
United States, Europe, and Japan (Appelbaum et al 2007). 
Presently, there are more than 30 research organizations in China PR that have initiated 
research activities studying the toxicological and environmental effects of nanomaterials and 
nanoparticles (Zhao, Zhao & Wang, 2008), and 120 research organisations undertaking general 
research into nanoscience and nanotechnology (Decker et al, 2009: 101). The three major 
national centres for nanotech are the National Centre for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology 
(NCNST) in Beijing, the Nanocommercialisation centre in Tianjin, and the China Safety Lab, 
which comes under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).3 The three areas 
of research, commercialisation, and safety to which these three centres are dedicated aptly 
indicate PR China’s current foci.  
In the view of Tang, Carley and Porter, the initial focus for China PR was regulatory 
support for significant research for technology commercialization and economic growth.  
However, a 2004 conference on biological and environmental nanoeffects and the launch of a 
program on the toxicological effects of nano suggested the start of a China PR nanosafety 
debate. As Qi argued, nanosafety research became ‘an integral part of nanotechnology 
research’ (Qi, 2008). China has run two major five-year projects: ‘The Toxicological Effects of 
Carbon Nanomaterials’ (2004-2008), and ‘The Environmental Activity and Health Impact of 
Ambient Superfine Particle’” (2006-2010). The China Nanosafety Lab, which examines 
environmental health and toxicology matters, is linked into a larger network of research centres 
for nanosafety. From its inception in 2008 with the establishment of the Laboratory for 
Biomedical Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety, it has worked with the Research Centre 
for Cancer Nanotechnology (at the Tianjin Cancer Hospital), the Lab for the Bio-environmental 
                                                          
3 Professor  Chunying Chen, Bilat-Silk (Bilateral Support for the International Linkage with 
China, FP7, 222800) roundtable on 9 November, 2011 at CASTED, Beijing, China PR. 
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Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety (established by the Institute of High-Energy Physics, 
or IHEP, and the NCNST), and the nano-biological research group at IHEP.   
The debate has intensified after a nanoparticle exposure accident in a poorly ventilated 
Chinese paint factory in August 2007, in which 7 workers contracted lung disease – 2 died 
(Song, et al).  After this incident,  ‘Chinese policymakers shifted focus to the risk management 
aspects of nanotechnology’ (Tang, et al); a large-scale program began in 2011 for example on 
factory monitoring for worker exposure.   The f 2007 incident realised several questions about 
whether the casual link between exposure and pulmonary illness can  in fact be proven. 
While the effects of nanoparticles on humans and on the environment have been the 
priority, there has also been acknowledgement of other societal concerns. The   Director’s Note 
in the 2007-8 Annual Report of the China Nanosafety Lab for example states that the lab ‘must 
take an extensive and deep research of nanotechnological influence on human health, 
environment, and social problems’ (Forefront, 2007-9).  
 In terms of oversight, the Ministry of Science and Technology is generally responsible for 
S&T policies and the planning and execution of national S&T plans and programs. It is also 
responsible for drafting rules, regulations and laws, and has responsibility for policy 
implementation. MOST plays an important role in distributing research funds including projects 
implemented by other agencies. MOST is supported by the Chinese Academy of Science and 
Technology for Development (CASTED), an institution that undertakes foresight and strategic 
research to provide macro-level advice and assistance for designing S&T plans. CASTED 
contains ISTS, the Institute of Science, Technology and Society, which conducts several large-
scale surveys on matters such as food safety risk, the public image of scientists etc. One of its 
three main areas of interest is the social environment of innovation. Thus while initially 
emphasis was solely on applied research in the nanotechnology field, new research teams such 
as the Institute of Policy and Management (IPM), part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
have  now been formed.4 
 
 
Nanoethics  (China PR) 
China PR is beginning to face a range of nanotechnology governance challenges, such as 
addressing low public awareness, developing a robust risk research strategy, and implementing 
an effective oversight system, very similar to those confronting the EU. One general concern 
                                                          
4  Professor Zhenzhen Li, Bilat-Silk (Bilateral Support for the International Linkage with China, 
FP7, 222800) roundtable on 9 November, 2011 at CASTED, Beijing, China PR. 
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that has emerged is whether the public outside of China, especially the United States public, will 
trust Chinese-made nanoproducts in the wake of scandals involving tainted pet food, 
toothpaste, children's toys, and drugs. Michelson asks: 
 …can China find an effective way to move up the value chain and transition from 
manufacturing cheaper, low-end products to more expensive, high-end, nano-engineered 
goods? …. In the wake of more immediate environmental and public health concerns 
currently affecting China, from managing pollution, to depleted fisheries, to lack of access 
to healthcare, how will disruptive challenges posed by nanotechnology exacerbate or 
enhance these existing problems? Will China have the resources and the luxury of 
proactively addressing environmental and health risks posed by nanotechnology in 
addition to these ongoing challenges? (Michelson, 2008:406).  
 
The concern with nanoethics started later in China PR than in the EU, not only due to the 
development delay in technology, but also perhaps because of differences in emphasis on 
societal concern.  In other words, China PR’s belief in social progress through scientific 
development means that economic impetus, rather than societal concern, is the major driver 
and overriding impetus behind new technologies.  
 
 
Choi has argued in 2003 that the following issues should be considered by Asian nanoethicists: 
• Equity between those with access to technology and those without, both in terms of 
developed versus underdeveloped countries, as well as internally within rural and urban 
populations 
• Privacy issues in Confucian systems (there has long been debate over the individual’s 
right to privacy of medical information, for example) 
• Gender issues (as the majority of nanoscientists are male) 
• Brain implants and other issues relating to human enhancement 
• Undue inducement, for human subjects in nanomedical clinical trials for example  
• Military uses of new technologies 
• Environmental toxicity, including how effectively nanowaste can be managed in space-
limited countries with large populations. 
 
These issues, when compared to EU debates on nanoethics, are quite similar (see Table 1 in 
the Appendix). Choi’s recommendations are: 
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• Better ethics education in schools  
• More dialogue between research institutes, granting bodies, and the public on ethical 
issues  
• Bioethics education for medical practitioners 
• More ELSI research funding 
• More international cooperation and knowledge sharing 
• Establishing NGOs to work primarily on ethical concerns related to technology 
development 
• Establishing independent watchdogs for nanotechnology-related policy and research for 
government and business (Choi, 2003). 
 
 
In China PR, CASTED has called for S&T ethics courses in universities on the basis that 
education is the main channel for building a culture of S&T values.  Tsinghua University for 
example has an engineering ethics course.  Several Chinese universities (Dalian Technology 
University, Beijing University, as well as Renmin, Hunan, and South-East), have research 
centres based around S&T ethics. CASTED is involved in the GEST (Global Ethics in Science 
and Technology) project as part of the EU 7th  framework.  GEST aims to explore the role of 
ethics in science and technology policy as it is currently developing both in Europe and in the 
two main global emerging economies of China and India.5  
          What of the Chinese debate? Compared to the reasonably extensive debate in the EU, it 
is fairly low-key. Chinese commentators have, albeit in very brief fashion, noted toxicity risks 
such as damage to human health and the environment.  However, some have introduced other 
issues.  Ying likens nanotechnology to GM foods issues, implying a public acceptance issue, 
albeit only in passing (Ying, 2006). Li, while mentioning environmental problems (giving the 
example of a Korean company that stopped production of a certain washing machine after 
pressure from Friends of the Earth) notes wider issues such as increased lifespan due to 
nanomedical development, i.e. the societal impact of longer-living, healthy citizens (Li, 2010). 
Wang notes potential problems relating to consumer rights (in the context of food and 
cosmetics products), as well as privacy and intellectual property rights issues. (Wang, 2010).  
Fan, perhaps the most ‘Western’ in his writing on nanoethics, notes that ‘compared with safety 
issues, research on ethical, legal and social issues should be strengthened’, as should dialogue 
                                                          
5  See www.uclan.ac.uk/gest. 
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between the scientific community and the public (Fan, 2010A). As Cao and Li note, the shift in 
approach from a predominately science-community-based approach to nanotechnology policy 
and regulation, to one that includes social scientists as well, is still ongoing (Cao et al, 2010). 
 
 
Public participation in the East 
The Thai government is reviewing the country’s first strategy plan on nanotechnology safety and 
ethics, drafted in 2011. The Thai National Nanotechnology Center, NANOTEC, held a public 
hearing session in Bangkok in 20122 where stakeholders from various sectors were given an 
opportunity to voice their opinion on the draft. (Nanosafety labeling can be expected in 2016, 
when regulations on nano safety and ethics are fully enforced.)6   In South Korea NGOs play an 
active role in bringing together scientists and the public. The ‘STS’ or Science-Technology-
Society approach informs the Korean school curriculum, just as in Japan schoolchildren are 
given guidelines to bioethics (Choi, 2007). In Taiwan, the National Strategic Plan for 
Responsible Nanotechnology, reflects the government’s ambition to realize the full potential of 
nanotechnologies while acknowledging the possibly harmful societal impacts from 
nanotechnologies. (The combination of nanotechnology and Chinese herbal medicine is a newly 
emerging field sought after by the Taiwanese industry, and is leading to some ethical 
discussion, most notably around intellectual property issues (Hasio, 2010)). In the most recent 
Taiwanese Science and Technology Development Plan (2009-2012), nanotechnology is given 
specifically notable attention. Two passages in the plan stand out and provide particular insight 
in to the government’s outlook on technology policy: 
The public's distrust of science and technology is at least partially attributable to 
insufficient relevant information and awareness. Appropriate ethical and legal responses 
may be needed to deal with the risks posed by new technologies to life and the 
environment, and the ethical conflicts they cause…Unlike such areas as medical 
biotechnology, where ethics committees have been established, little has been done thus 
far to address research ethics in many new technological fields in Taiwan (such as genetic 
technology and nanotechnology).7 
                                                          
6  Thailand pushing forward on Nanosafety regulations’, January 18, 2011. Retrieved 12 
December, 2011, from http://www.biospectrumasia.com/content/180111THA15262.asp. 
7  National Science and Technology Development Plan 2009-2012, National Science Council, 
Executive Yuan, Taiwan,  http://web1.nsc.gov.tw/public/Attachment/91214167571.PDF,  p. 60; 
See also Mika Purra & Noah Richmond, 'Mapping Emerging Nanotechnology Policies and 
Regulation: The Case of Taiwan' (2010). Retrieved 28 December, 2011 from 
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The issue of ‘public distrust’ is one that China PR has been starting to face in terms of GM food. 
Whilst expert Technology Assessment (TA) has a history in China PR, it tends to be dominated 
by natural scientists with little background in social issues.  Information delivery, rather than 
debate, is more likely to be the aim of any survey, as in the Dalian Technical University 2008 
nanotechnology survey (of 1000 samples). This survey concluded that the Chinese public had 
greater awareness of nano than the US. CASTED conducted a survey in 3 cities in 2008 on GM 
food, concluding that public non-awareness of the subject was widespread (while noting 
variations according to city size and level of tertiary education.  
While TA is known, participatory Technology Assessment (pTA) is a relatively new 
development, and has so far been limited in China PR to a consensus conference on GM food 
in 2008, one with 25 participants. This conference was organised by CAS, and the S&T 
commission for Xicheng District, Beijing. Called ‘Science and Community 2008 – GM foods’, the 
aim was to recruit volunteers from varied socio-economic backgrounds; 38 applications were 
received, from which 20 public participants were chosen (plus 5 experts on GM foods and 
health, ethics and society, consumer choice and legislation).  The final document report showed 
more uncertainty post-conference than before about the relationship between the public and 
experts, as some participants began to ‘modify their submissive position towards the experts’ 
while remaining supportive towards the government. The primary result of the conference, it 
was concluded, was clarification of the need for more public education.8 
GM food, nanotechnology, stem cell technology and IT, are still seen as the major areas 
of attention for the science community, rather than the public, but there is a growing realisation 
amongst the scientific community that a wider approach, involving greater awareness of societal 
concerns, and potentially also pTA, is required.  A November 2011 workshop on academic 
morality and scientific ethics to facilitate integration between the natural and the social sciences 
suggest the China PR scientific community’s realisation that the social sciences have an integral 
role to play in technology evaluation and implementation.  
 
 
EU nanohistory, nanoregulation, nanopolicy and nanoethics  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/regulatingnanotechnologiesnanopd
fs/Taiwan2010.pdf. 
8 Du Peng, ‘The Practice of TA in China’ (Chinese Academy of Science), NCSTE presentation 
on 10 November, 2011, Beijing. 
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China PR is not alone in its belief that nanotechnology is an economic driver: In terms of the 
2004 Lisbon Strategy, now replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy, Europe has clarified stated its 
aim of being a highly competitive knowledge-based global economy.9 A focus on 
nanotechnologies was seen as a key part of this strategy. Thus the formation of the 2004 
European Nano-Electronics Initiative Advisory, in terms of which European technology 
companies such as Philips, Nokia, Ericsson, AMD, and IBM decided that if Europe wanted to 
lead the world, it would need to invest at least 6 billion euro per year to switch from micro to 
nanoscale electronics. A public-private partnership charged to develop and implement a 
European nano-electronics research agenda first met in 2004. Its goals include: supporting 
research and investment in nano, speeding up innovation and productivity, the facilitation and 
acceleration of market penetration of new technologies, aligning research/technology with 
European policies and regulatory frameworks, and increasing public awareness, understanding, 
and acceptance of nanotechnologies (Adams, et al, 2006: 238-9). A later group, The European 
Network of Excellence (Nano2Life) 2004-2008 involved nearly 200 scientists, 23 research 
organizations, and 12 countries, and has joined with industrial partners to identify regional 
centers, disciplines, and expertise available for collaboration. Goals included developing joint 
research projects on four major technical platforms: functionalisation, handling, detection, and 
integration of nanodevices.  
The history of EU nanoregulation should be placed in the context of biotechnology 
regulation, which dates back to the establishment in 1991 of a European Commission Group on 
Ethics in Science and Technology. The Group was constituted to advise the Commission on 
how to exercise its powers as regards the ethical aspects of biotechnology. It noted  in its 
general report examples of embedded ethics into policy such as the Science and Society Action 
Plan (2001), the Action Plan Life Sciences and Technology (2007), as well as legislative 
activities such as directives governing clinical trials, patents, data protection, the use of animals 
in experimentation, and the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Action 
Plan (2009).10 The EGAIS (Ethical Governance of Emerging Technologies) project, funded by 
the 7th Framework Programme (Science in Society) for example, has as its mission ‘to 
overcome the existent limitations of the current approaches to ethical governance in projects 
                                                          
9  Retrieved 15 December 2011 from http://ex.europa.eu/europe2020/targets/eu-
targets/index_en.htm. See also http://www.eu2020regions.eu/node/6, retrieved February 2, 
2012. 
10 Retrieved 15 December 2011 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/GAR%20EGE%202005-2010_WEB.PDF.  
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with technical development’.11 The European Commission's Directorate-General and Services 
involved in nanotechnology number over a dozen, including 7 agencies for risk evaluation.12  
EU awareness of nanotechnology issues began in earnest in 2003, after discussion on 
potential risks by the European Parliament’s Green Party, (Oud, 2007) and after the publication 
of the 2001 National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the USA. In terms of the EU’s 
‘framework’ structures for funding research and technological development, Framework 
Programme 6 (FP6)  (2002-6) indicated that nanotechnology had become a research priority, 
possibly stimulated by a need to compete with the USA. FP6 was introduced with policy 
objectives to enhance innovation, and to ‘change the European research landscape through the 
introduction of the integrated European Research Area (ERA), and create sustainable growth, 
increased employment and greater social cohesion’ (Pandza et al, 2011). 
The 3 EC Scientific Committees set up in 2004 were: SCCS (the Scientific Committee on 
Consumer Safety), which oversees nanomaterials in consumer products; SCER (the Scientific 
Committee on Health and Environmental Risks), which looks at nanotechnology in food, as well 
as medical and environmental issues, and SCENHIR (the European Commission’s Scientific 
Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks), which looks at methodologies for 
risk assessment of new technologies such as nanotechnology.13 
 The EC’s Action Plan on Nanotechnology (2005), as well as considering possible 
adverse effects on health and the environment, also highlighted the ethical issues of 
nanotechnology’s potential to contribute towards the Millennium Development Goals. As well as 
discussing public participation and education, the Plan encouraged internationally cooperative 
work on nanoregulation. In 2007, the European Commission accepted the first implementation 
report (2005-2007) of the Action Plan. The second implementation report was adopted in 2009, 
with the statement that ‘efforts to address societal and safety concerns must be continued to 
ensure the safe and sustainable development of nanotechnology.’14  
 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) set up in 1991, 
has a strictly advisory role, with a global outlook rather than a specifically EU one (Heemeren). 
    
                                                          
11  Retrieved 15 December 2011 from http://www.egais-project.eu>.  EU ethics advising has 
seen (according to Cordis, the EU’s information repository) an increased level of funding 
allocated in terms of the EU’s 7th Framework Programmes (2007-2011). 
12   The full list can be seen at the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/links_en.html. 
13   Retrieved 18 December 2011 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_023.pdf. 
14 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0607:FIN:EN:PDF. 
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The EGE’s 2006 Opinion 21 paper underlined ‘the vital importance of addressing concern for 
safety with respect to … nanotechnology in general’. It advocated, in regards to nanomedicine, 
the need to ‘establish measures to verify the safety of nanomedical products’, and issues of 
military usage of nanotechnology, enhancement, economic equity and animal testing.15 The 
EGE group has been referred to as ‘largely unknown’, however, according to a public 
(admittedly global rather than EU) survey.16  Another EU advisory group is ETAG, The 
European Technology Assessment Group, which runs projects on the potential environmental, 
health and safety risks of engineered nanomaterials  (such as their project on chemical risk in 
2006, and on human enhancement in 2008-9).   
             The High Level Expert Group (HLEG) was convened by the EC in 2010 to develop 
possible policy measures to promote the industrial take-up of new technologies by EU 
industries. The HLEG’s nanotechnology report suggests two views of convergence, one 
implying mutually enabling technologies, and the other a culture of promotion of enhancement 
(Foresighting: 2; de S. Cameron, 2007: 29). The interesting parts of the HLEG document are its 
advocation of both moral pluralism, and of the need for ethics to be an intrinsic part of 
technological advances.  Stating that technological development must ‘harmonize with the 
values of diversity, social justice, international security, and environmental responsibility’, it 
recommends preparation of an international ‘code of good conduct’.17 
The European Project NanoCode, a 2-year multi-stakeholder dialogue providing input to 
the European Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences & Nanotechnologies Research 
commenced in January 2010, with the aims of monitoring stakeholder input and suggesting 
revisions to this Code of Conduct (EU-Coc).18 In 2011, its report on stakeholder attitudes 
towards the Code concluded that awareness of the code ‘was limited to a community of 
selected key experts’ and was not ‘embedded in the everyday life’ of the large majority of 
researchers in Europe. The report also concluded that few governments seemed able to 
communicate the Code’s principles to stakeholders effectively.19 An issue raised by 
stakeholders has been that of the ‘lack of teeth’ of voluntary codes such as this, which have not 
                                                          
15 Retrieved 18 December from http://ec.europa.eu/nanotechnology/pdf/swedish-presidency-
event/martinho_de_silva.pdf. 
16 ‘Report on the European Commission's Public Online Consultation. Towards a Strategic 
Nanotechnology Action Plan (SNAP) 2010-2015’, p. 4. Retrieved 18 December from 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/snap/report_en.pdf. 
17 Retrieved 18 December from http://www.ntu.no/2020/final_report-en.pdf, p. 9, p. 54. 
18 Retrieved 18 December from 
http://www.innovationsgesellschaft.ch/media/archive2/publikationen/nanocode-newsletter-2.pdf. 
19 Retrieved 18 December from http://www.nanocode.eu/files/reports/nanocode/nanocode-
consultation-synthesis-report.pdf  (p. 6).  
Nanoethics (2012) 6:137–150 
DOI 10.1007/s11569-012-0146-2 
 13 
been widely adopted – although some research institutions claim that their own codes are 
sufficient. This raises the further issue of whether the Code should be promoted as the ‘one and 
only’, or allowed to coexist with the institutional guidelines. Suggestions on how to give the 
Code some ‘teeth’ ranged from the development of tailor-made codes i.e. specific for nano-
companies, a ‘naming and blaming’ in case of non-compliance, linking compliance to public 
funding, and incorporation of the Code into the EC Research Framework as a guideline. 
 In 2008, the European Commission (Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials) concluded 
that existing EU regulatory frameworks covered in principle the potential health, safety and 
environmental risks related to nanomaterials, and stressed that the protection of health, safety 
and the environment needed to be enhanced mainly by improving the implementation of current 
legislation. In answer to this communication, however, the European Parliament declared the 
EC’s statement to be misleading and ‘one-dimensional’.20 
 
 
Nanoethics (EU and the West) 
Whereas nanoethics in China PR is an emerging field, and still remains focused  to a 
degree on toxicity risk, Western commentators  have a wider view of potential NELSI issues. A 
2008 summary of ‘nanorisks’ - or ‘nanopportunities’, depending on one’s level of optimism – 
include ownership of technology and accountability; privacy (increasingly undetectable 
nanoscale devices); human enhancement, and public involvement in technology development 
(Wood et al, 2008:17). Bennett-Woods notes issues of human dignity and also of fidelity, or 
competing loyalties – security versus privacy or profit versus equity - as well as social justice, 
military and security implications, and informed consent to new technological ideas (Bennett-
Woods, 2008:5). Spagnolo and Daloiso, arguing that nanomedicine is the most useful 
application of nanotechnology, summarise ethical issues as: toxicity, immunogenicity and 
biocompatibility, nanoparticle stability, human enhancement, privacy and integrity, and the shift 
from patient-doctor interaction to home-care technology used by the patient (Spagnolo et al, 
2009: 396). Schummer selects six areas of concern, including the more speculative areas of the 
increasing autonomy of machines, how nano should be controlled (the ‘grey goo’ scenario), and 
of biomedical application or enhancement. He also sees military applications, health and 
environmental risks, and the equity issue of developing countries, as well as the issue of 
                                                          
20 European Parliament: Report on regulatory aspects of nanomaterials (2008/2208(INI)). 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. A6-0255/2009. Retrieved 3 
February, 2012 from http://nano.foe.org.au/node/329. 
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intellectual property rights (Schummer, 2007). New nano-products may lead to a displacement 
of jobs and major changes in trade balances between countries; manufacturing in countries with 
weaker controls (and subsequently exported worldwide may increase risk, and benefits may be 
unevenly distributed (leading to a so-called ‘nanodivide’ – Mnyusiwalla et al, 2003). More 
broadly, nanotechnology has been condemned for its potential to advance Western 
consumerism; little research has been aimed at products that might benefit the poor (McKibben, 
2003).  
The West shares with China PR a strong concern however on toxicity risk. The effect of 
nanotoxins on humans, animals and the environment have yet to be determined, and laboratory 
studies have suggested some physical damage through the inhalation of nanoparticles, leading 
to the fear that nanotech might potentially be ‘the next asbestos’ (Anderson, et al, 2009:5). 
Nanoparticles have been alleged to damage DNA, negatively affect proteins, and cause cell 
death (Kirsten, Gerloff, 2009). A study at the University of Rochester found that when rats 
breathed in nanoparticles, the particles settled in the brain and lungs, which led to significant 
increases in biomarkers for inflammation and stress response (Buzea et al, 2007). Mice studies 
have also found that nanoscale titanium dioxide, touted for use in many energy applications, 
can cause genetic instability (Trouiller, 2009). A two-year study at UCLA's School of Public 
Health found laboratory mice consuming nano-titanium dioxide showed DNA and chromosome 
damage (Elder, 2006). Several types of engineered nanomaterials including titanium dioxide 
and carbon nanotubes are believed to produce pulmonary inflammation and fibrosis in animals 
(Shvedova, et al, 2009), and even brain damage (Oberdorster, 2004). Nanoparticles may 
increase the risk of strokes (Evans, 2007). There is concern that carbon nanotubes may 
potentially be ‘the next asbestos’ (Anderson, et al, 2009). A further issue is that of environmental 
damage, as there is no clear view on how long nanoengineered materials may last in landfill, for 
example. (The table in Appendix A attempts to categorise these commonly agreed issues, and 
the arguments pro and contra their benefit, indicating the level of similarity between East and 
West.) 
 
 
Public participation in the EU 
The UK government has stated that ‘properly targeted and sufficiently resourced public 
dialogue will be crucial in securing a future for nanotechnologies’ (Response, 2005: para. 80). 
There have been several EU projects designed to increase public dialogue on the socio-ethical 
concerns of nanotechnology, such as Nanologue (2005-6), aimed at the facilitation of a Europe-
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wide dialogue among science, business and civil society about its benefits and potential 
impacts, or  Nanobio-RAISE (2006-7) intended to bring together nanobiotechnologists, ethicists 
and communication specialists to anticipate and discuss societal and ethical issues, or Nanoplat 
(2009), aimed at the ‘points of intersection between the sphere of production on the one hand 
and consumers on the other.21 The SNAP global public consultation conducted from 18 
December 2009 to 19 February 2010, concluded optimistically that, there was a ’good or very 
good perception of EU governance related to nanotechnologies in terms of stakeholder 
consultation and setting research priorities’ (SNAP: 4, 17), However, another EU project, 
framingNano (2008-2010), noted greater uncertainty about public acceptance of 
nanotechnology. 
Individual EU members also have run dialogue initiatives; for example, in The 
Netherlands, ‘NanoNed’ allocates 15% of its budget to research on societal impact,22 while 
‘Nanopodium’ (launched in December 2009 in The Netherlands) has as its mission the 
stimulation of public dialogue about the threats, opportunities and applications of 
nanotechnology.  In Germany’s ‘NanoDialogue’, representatives from the scientific world, the 
business community, environmental, consumer and women’s associations, trade unions, 
churches, ministries and authorities provide input in to the public debate on the opportunities 
and risks of using nanotechnologies.  
 However, despite the positive initiatives – and many more - listed above, the 2009 
reflection on the seminal 2004 Royal Society report argued that more needs to be done in the 
field of public engagement. The report added that nanoparticles allegedly are being released 
into the environment and that in the view of one collaborator on the updated report, there has 
been no ‘meaningful change in regulatory practice or social engagement in the UK’  (Beacon, 
2009: 5, 46). 
 
 
 
Global collaboration  
...it is still necessary to set up a viable system based on the precautionary 
principle.....since research in the field of social and ethical evaluation of nanotechnology 
                                                          
21 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from http://nanobio-
raise.org/groups/editors/menus/main/activities/view;   http://www.nanoplat.org/?q=node/4. 
22 Retrieved 18 December 2011 from 
http://www.nanoforum.org/nf06~modul~showmore~folder~99999~scc~news~scid~3743~.html?
action=longview. 
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developments in China is not as advanced as in the USA and Europe, cooperation is 
important to avoid making similar mistakes and to promote the smooth development of 
nanotechnology (Decker, 2009: 106).  
 
The major achievement of the EU nanoadvisory ‘movement’ has been the establishment of 
standards for working with nanomaterials. The CEN/TC 352 'Nanotechnologies' (established in 
2005) to develop a set of standards, and the 2006 EC establishment of REACH - Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical Substances) addressing the following 
aspects of nanotechnologies: classification, terminology and nomenclature; metrology and 
instrumentation, including specifications for reference materials; test methodologies; modelling 
and simulation; science-based health, safety and environmental practices; and nanotechnology 
products and processes.23  
The second major achievement is the 2009 Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research, described as follows:  
The recently released Code…developed by the European Commission is one code that is 
voluntary, but which has originated in a political sphere and which demands a higher level 
of accountability.… the code seeks to intervene at an earlier stage in the development 
cycle of nanotechnologies, embedding principles of responsibility at the research stage.24 
 
 
Given its recent focus on nanosafety, unsurprisingly China PR has published 15 
nanotechnology standards since the establishment of its Committee of National Nanotechnology 
Standards (2005), which dealt mainly with risk assessment of nanoparticles. This focus 
translated into its international work on the global nanotechnology regulation bodies/projects, of 
which there are 9 major ones, including REACH, already mentioned above. The other 8 are: (1) 
the International Council on Nanotechnology (ICON) (Kulinowski, 2007);  (2) the European 
Standards Committee (CEN/TC352) Nanotechnologies (set up with the aim of providing an 
international standard);25  (3) the Globally Harmonised Scheme for classification and labeling of 
                                                          
23  Retrieved 21 December from 
http://www.cen.eu/cen/Sectors/Sectors/Nanotechnologies/Pages/default.aspx. 
24 Retrieved 21 December from 
http://www.framingnano.eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=147&Itemid=1. 
25 Retrieved 21 December from http://www.ecostandard.org/downloads_a/cen-overview-std-
nanotech-sept07.pdf; see point 2.1.1.  It includes analysis of national standards bodies in the 
EU, UK, North America, Japan, China, and Korea as well  as brief mention of international 
standards bodies such as the E56 Committee on Nanotechnology, which rather vaguely lists as 
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substances (GHS); and (4) the International Standards Organization (ISO. The various ISO 
standards provide ways of evaluating risk; they are primarily methodological tools for industry 
players. However it should be noted that the ISO has a member list of 162 countries, including 
China, which has been involved in 707 standards - more than any other of the countries listed.26  
(China PR hosted   ISO/TCC 229 in 2008 in Shanghai). 
The 5th is the International Council on Risk Governance (IRGC), established in 2003, at 
the initiative of the Swiss government; its Council has members from 13 different countries, one 
of which is China.27  The final 3 are: The Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology (UNESCO/COMEST) and two OECD nanotechnology working parties, WPN (the 
Working Party on Nanotechnology), with a focus on governance, and WPMN  (the Working 
Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials),  an international forum for the further development of 
test guidelines and strategies needed for the proper implementation of regulation.  
The OECD and UNITAR jointly held Awareness-Raising Workshops on 
Nanotechnology/Manufactured Nanomaterials for Developing and Transition Countries, held in 
Beijing, Abidjan, Lodz, Kingston, and Alexandria. In addition to the formal structures discussed 
briefly above, there have been international dialogues such as that on the Responsible 
Research and Development of Nanotechnology (established by The European Commission in 
2004), and the Meridian Institute’s Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and the poor, which has 
resulted in a paper, a news service, and two workshops (India and Brazil, 2006 and 2007).28  
 A November 2011 project on research methods for managing the risk of engineered 
nanoparticles and engineered nanomaterials, the MARINA project, under FP 7 of the EC, will 
run for 4 years and involve the collaboration of 47 different scientific and industrial partners, 
including China PR. 
There are also individual joint country agreements, such as the 2002 EU/China  co-
operation agreement in the field of material sciences. This agreement facilitates the participation 
of Chinese research organisations, including companies, in European research projects with 
Chinese funding and vice versa.  In addition, the EU and China have a joint agreement to 
exchange data relating to safety testing in order to boost research into consumer safety 
respective to nanotechnology products.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
one of its activities ‘as the  maintenance of appropriate global liaison relationships with activities 
related to nanotechnology’. 
26  http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members.htm 
27  Retrieved 21 December from http://www.irgc.org/irgc/about_irgc 
28  http://www.merid.org/Content/Projects/Global_Dialogue_on_Nanotechnology_and_the_Poor. 
]aspx 
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         China’s regulatory regime for the management of nanotechnology chemicals will likely 
manage risks comparable to those identified under the EU’s REACH regulation, and in this 
context, in 2009, the government revised the chemical substance rules in order to incorporate 
risk assessment, risk management and data submission requirements, similar to REACH (Jarvis  
et al, 2010 :11-12).     
 
 
 
Conclusion: The nano environment in China PR versus in the EU 
Although there are obvious economic drivers behind the development of nanotechnology in both 
countries, the difference is in the degree of account taken of public concern, and the greater 
emphasis on development over social concerns in China PR. In the latter, industry employs the 
label of ‘nano’ as a plus point when advertising nanoproducts, whereas in Europe  there is 
concern  about nanolabelling, as well as more vocal consumer movements. However, the 
current food debate in China may signify a turning point in the perception of scientific 
development, and a need to accelerate public debate. The focus in China is currently on the 
responsibility of the scientist; in the EU it is on government accountability to the public – yet one 
might risk the prediction here that ultimately this will also become a governmental issue in 
China, since individual responsibility alone cannot guide S&T development. 
Whereas the official debate on benefits and risks is not markedly different in both areas, 
the public debate in China PR lags behind the EU. This is partly due to the fact that the public in 
China PR appears currently more concerned about GM food, and also to a lack of channels for 
public participation in China PR.  
Yet public participation is globally seen as increasingly integral to governmental decision 
making, particularly given the economic effects of product boycotting, and China PR will 
arguably soon (and perhaps already is in terms of GM food)  face this inevitable issue. The two 
regions are converging. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Categories of nanoethics issues in the East and West  (China PR/EU) 
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Issue Pro (West) Contra (West) Contra (East) 
ENHANCEMENT  A new and improved ‘better 
human’ with increased 
longevity, fewer health issues, 
possibly even enhanced 
intelligence through 
IT/cognitive/biological 
convergence (NBIC) 
Creation of new elites 
(enhancement only for the 
rich); loss of ‘humanness’ 
(‘nanoself’); increased 
longevity means more 
pressure on resources 
IT/neurobioengineered 
implants;  equity of access 
MILITARY USE  Better wound care; more 
precise targeting (less 
collateral damage) 
Leading to  ‘unequal wars’; 
creation of ‘supersoldiers’  
Military uses of 
nanotechnology, i.e. weapons 
HEALTH RISKS Health amelioration, better 
drugs; portability  – better 
health care for remote and 
rural communities; economic 
benefit of reduced health care 
spending  
Threats to human health 
through dermal exposure or 
inhalation or ingestion of 
nanoparticles 
Threats to human health 
through dermal exposure or 
inhalation or ingestion of 
nanoparticles 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
HARM 
Amelioration of environmental 
issues such as non-potable 
groundwater 
Threat to environmental 
health  
Threat to environmental 
health; nanowaste and space 
limitations 
ACCESS/EQUITY 
 
General economic benefit 
globally in terms of new 
products that will affect the 
construction, energy, medtech 
and IT industries 
Increased (nano)divide 
between developed and 
developing countries  - issues 
of distributive justice, global 
benefit  
Nanodivides within Asian 
countries with large rural 
and/or poor populations; 
undue inducement 
PRIVACY Smaller and less obtrusive 
surveillance devices; privacy 
of medical information; 
greater security 
Increasingly miniaturised 
surveillance devices lead to 
potential loss of civil liberties, 
increased surveillance of 
average citizens 
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TABLE 2:  A comparison of nanoethics environments in the EU and China29 
 
 Europe Asia (China) 
Social values: Autonomy, individual human rights Harmony, community 
Attitude towards 
S&T and scientists: 
• Public differentiation between 
technologies i.e. differing risks for 
nuclear, nano, GM 
• Risk v benefit  
• Post-Fukushima emphasis on 
confidence/or lack thereof in 
government,  according to how it 
handles S&T crises 
 
• Innovation is always good  
• Tao governs technology;  
• Harmony between tian 
(nature) and ren (human) 
• Trust in government  
(although this may be 
starting to decrease due to 
food scandals) 
• Concern with social 
responsibility of scientists 
 
GM food as example GM ‘backlash’  in many EU countries GM issue products sold in China  - 
but must be labelled; public distrust 
Which nanoissues 
are seen as 
significant? 
Toxicity (human and environmental), 
enhancement, military use, privacy, 
distributive justice 
Safety; science governance; global 
security an emerging issue, as is 
public  knowledge deficit 
Economic benefit 
focus  
Better drugs e.g. for cancer treatment General economic driver 
Consumer EU 2013 mandatory labelling of cosmetics New equals good; and ‘nano’ are 
                                                          
29 Much of this information was taken from roundtable discussions in Beijing 9-11 November, 
2011. 
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confidence in new 
products 
that contain nanoparticles 
 
 
pluses for marketeers 
Institutes leading 
nanoresearch 
EC Action Plan on Nanotechnology 2005-
9 (ongoing implementation reports in 
2007, 2009) 
2000: National Steering Committee 
for Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology established in 
China’; 2003; nanosafety lab  
Seminal reports that 
have triggered 
nanoethics 
concerns: 
Greenpeace report, the Royal Society and 
Royal Academy (RS/RAE), report and 
insurance company Swiss Re’s report 
(2003-4) 
 
Role of NGOs in S&T 
advising: 
Strong in terms of TA and policymaker 
liaison  
NGOs small in size and relatively 
weak in organisational capacity, no 
policy-effecting channels 
TA infrastructure Varied across Europe  Established for  about 10 years  
Participatory 
Technology 
Assessment 
Many European dialogue initiatives, plus 
individual (national) initiatives in Germany, 
the Netherlands, UK etc.  
• Not yet – planned for 2012 
• Consensus conference 2008 on 
GM food – with 25 participants; 
from that negative experience 
scientific community focussed on 
Code of Conduct as way of 
promoting acceptance 
Global view and  
cooperation 
On standards On standards  
Increasing awareness of Western 
debates 
International bodies 
- IRG, GHS, ISO, 
REACH, Comest, 
OECD etc 
EU representatives on all China PR active on ISO and 
REACH  
Codes? EU Code for responsible nanoresearch 
 
• MOST S&T general 
guidelines applied to nanoresearch 
from beginning  
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• CAS Special committee on 
science ethics examined  scientific 
misconduct in 2010-11 and has  
ethics of emerging technologies as 
next focus (GM and nano) 
• Code predicted in 2012 
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